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DISASTER INSURANCE OR A DISASTROUS 








We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main 
institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low 
risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the 
institutional set-up is fundamentally flawed. We find that the market is likely to lead to 
“specialist” equilibria, where insurers specialize in serving either high or low risk regions. As 
a result the reinsurance company, which offers cover to all insurers at the same price, is likely 
to suffer from a portfolio with mainly “bad” risks. We show that increasing the premium rate 
customers have to pay, a policy undertaken by the French authorities, will not necessarily 
solve these problems and comes at a high cost to the final consumer (and taxpayer). 
JEL Code: D78, G22, L11. 





Department of Economics 
KTH 439, 1280 Main Street West 
Hamilton, Ont. L8S 4M4 
Canada 
jametti@mcmaster.ca 
Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg 
École des HEC 







We wish to thank Marius Brülhart, François Marechal, Deszö Szalay and Ernst-Ludwig von 
Thadden for helpful comments. Remaining errors and omissions are ours. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent evolution of climatic conditions in many parts of the world has brought insurance
against natural disasters back on the policy agenda. Both the costs of ﬂoods and the violence
of storms (e.g. the storm Lothar at the end of 1999 has caused damage of several billion
Euro in France, Germany and Switzerland) seem to have increased in the last decade.
Natural disasters have speciﬁc characteristics that lead to market failure in the absence of
government intervention. In particular the “objective” distribution of damage is very hard
to specify (or varies substantially across time) and the distribution of claims is very uneven
across space. In Britain for example, damage due to subsidence (unheard of prior to the
1970s) has caused claims of the order of £3.5 billion since 1975. Only areas with clay soils
are aﬀected, since this type of soil strongly contracts when it dries out.
Natural disasters are often classiﬁed as “uninsurable”. Jaﬀee and Russell (1996) indi-
cate three characteristics that are often mentioned in this context: i) the market displays
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, ii) the potential loss is very large and iii)
it is diﬃcult (impossible) to obtain precise estimates of the probability of the event.
In many countries, such particularities have led to some form of government intervention
in the market for natural disaster insurance. Von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) examines the
property insurance market in ﬁve countries (Britain, Spain, France, Germany and Switzer-
land). He shows that there is a wide variety of regulatory systems in these countries, ranging
form integrated state insurance in some parts of Switzerland to laissez-faire in Britain.
In the present paper, we study the French system of natural disaster insurance. Its
main speciﬁcity is the fact that it is a mixed system in which both the state and the
private insurance sector play an important role. Let us start oﬀ by brieﬂy outlining its basic
structure1. Natural disaster insurance was introduced in France in 1982 as a reaction to a
severe ﬂood a few months earlier. The term “natural disaster” (“catastrophe naturelle”) is
not deﬁned in the law creating the system. A commission, formed of representatives of the
Ministries of Interior, Finance and Environment, has to decide whether a given occurrence
is deemed a natural disaster and hence makes claimants eligible for reimbursement. The
conditions of the insurance (e.g. premium rates and excesses) are ﬁx e db yd e c r e ea n du n i f o r m
across the country. Insurance is compulsory, presumably to reduce problems of adverse
selection among property owners. Similarly, all insurance companies oﬀering (other types
of) property insurance in a speciﬁc area are obliged to include protection against natural
disasters. Premium rates are deﬁned as a percentage of other property insurance premiums
(in particular ﬁre), while excesses (for non-commercial buildings) are ﬁxed amounts per
contract and event.
An important institutional feature for our analysis is the existence of a publicly owned
reinsurance company, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR). Reinsurance is not com-
pulsory, and insurers are free to contract with other, private, reinsurance companies. Rein-
surance with the state reinsurance company is, however, particularly attractive, both be-
cause of the reinsurance premiums it charges and because it can oﬀer unlimited cover (it is
covered by a state guarantee). Insurance companies that decide to reinsure with the public
reinsurer are oﬀered two types of contracts; proportional contracts (for a given percentage of
premium income the reinsurance company covers a given percentage of claims) and stop-loss
contracts (the reinsurance company covers all claims that exceed a given multiple of annual
premium income). The combination of these two types of reinsurance necessarily implies
that the CCR (and ultimately the tax-payer) will bear most of the cost when a large-scale
disaster occurs.
In the ﬁrst 20 years of its existence, the CCR never managed to accumulate any substan-
tial level of reserves. In 1999, it was on the verge of bankruptcy, and had to be recapitalized
with FF 1 billion. All this occurred in spite of the fact that the claims/premium ratio for
the entire period was only of the order of 55% (c.f. von Ungern (2004), p. 91). Parallel
1The description below is drawn from von Ungern (2004). The author also provides a more in depth
description of the natural disaster insurance in France.
1to the recapitalization, premiums and excesses for the property owners were raised by 30%,
and the amount of coverage the CCR was willing to supply on a proportional basis was
limited to 50%2.
The purpose of this paper is to build a simple model which allows us to understand
why the reinsurance company was unable to participate in the proﬁts of the system to any
signiﬁcant extent. In our model, two forces drive this result. First, there is a problem of
regulatory capture. The CCR paid the French insurance companies a large proportion of
premium to cover, mainly ﬁctitious, “administrative costs”.3 Second, the CCR is subject
to important problems of risk selection. Given the structure of the system, there is a
natural tendency for certain insurers to concentrate only on the “good” regions and buy
little reinsurance, while others insure the “bad” regions and then reinsure with the CCR.
Our model shows that increasing the premium rate might not be an adequate solution to
this problem. Indeed, the higher the premium rate, the greater the incentives to “separate”
the good from the bad risks. If one takes into account this adjustment eﬀect, it is not clear
that an increase in the customer premium rate will in fact solve the CCR’s problems.
In a more general discussion we address the question of the full “social” cost of the system.
This cost is deﬁned as the sum of ﬁnal costumer premium payments and expected losses of
the reinsurance company. The latter presumably covered by the state. The model illustrates
that increasing the premium rate to improve the ﬁnancial situation of the reinsurance comes
at a high cost to the taxpayer.
W i t h i nt h es i m p l em o d e l ,w ew o r kw i t hr i s kn e u tral insurers. This necessarily implies
that the choice to reinsure is discrete (either full or no reinsurance). If expected damage is
lower than the reinsurance premium the insurer will not buy reinsurance cover. If the inverse
holds, it will buy complete cover, instead. This in turn implies that the reinsurance company
cannot be ﬁnancially viable (reinsurance premium income will be lower than expected cost).
This property does not necessarily hold if onew e r et ow o r kw i t hr i s ka v e r s ei n s u r e r s .F o r
this reason we introduce a more general (and more complex) variant of the model, where
insurers are risk averse. This change results in “interior” solutions for reinsurance and
potentially positive (expected) proﬁts for the reinsurer. This more general model is no
longer analytically tractable, but we conjecture that the outcome would be very similar to
our basic model, especially the fact that an increase in the premium rate is likely to lead to
a higher degree of risk selection.
As mentioned above, von Ungern (2004) provides a critical appraisal of the French nat-
ural disaster insurance. He describes empirically most of the problems studied in this paper.
However, he does not proceed to a formal analysis. A more favourable assessment of the
system is given in Michel-Kerjan (2001), concluding that “the partnership between public
and private sectors has passed the test of twenty years of operation”. This author does not
address the problem of risk selection, and he assigns the depletion of reserves of the public
reinsurance company (which lead to the collapse of the system in 1999) to an exceptional
succession of high damage years in the 1990s. This assessment seems unconvincing, since,
as shown in von Ungern (2004) using data from the CCR, the accumulated excess premium
income (premium income minus damage payments) over the period 1990-1998 was over 10
billion French Francs. This amount alone would have been enough to pay the entire damage
payments for the year 1999 of 6.6 billion French Francs.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model and characterizes po-
tential equilibrium outcomes. Section 3 discusses which of the potential equilibria are Nash
equilibria. Section 4 presents the eﬀect of an increase in the premium rate. Section 5 ad-
dresses the situation of the reinsurance company, demonstrating that the eﬀect from an
increase in the premium on its expected proﬁts is dampened with a higher degree of risk
selection. Section 6 presents a discussion of our results, while Section 7 concludes.
2Stop loss cover continues to be available.
3In Spain, working with an identical system of premium collection, commission for administrative costs
is 5%, while it was, until recently, 24% in France.
22 The model
2.1 Setup
Consider a country with two regions i ∈ [H;L]. A region has a stock of H houses, each of
(normalized) value 1. We assume that a house can be aﬀected by damage, which destroys
the house completely (damage value = 1). Damage occurrence for each house in region i
is assumed to follow a binomial distribution with the probability of damage equal to pi.
We assume that damage occurrence is independent both among houses and among regions.
Hence, for each region the expected damage is Hpi.R e g i o n s d i ﬀer only in the respective
probability of an event occurring, with the H-region having a higher probability of damage
than the L-region (pH >p L).
Housing insurance is compulsory, and its price is ﬁxed at rate θ independent of pi.T h e
service is provided by identical insurers in a competitive market. Therefore, the market
outcome in the model will be determined by a symmetric, free-entry equilibrium. Whenever
an insurer j decides to oﬀer service in a particular region i, its market share will be given
by 1/N ∗
i ,w h e r eN∗
i is the number of insurers active in the region.4
There exists a single reinsurance company which oﬀers proportional contracts to the
market in all regions.5 Reinsurance is voluntary, and each insurer can decide on the fraction
of the portfolio that it wants to reinsure. We denote by rj ∈ [0,1] the rate of retention for
insurer j.6 Note that an insurer can reinsure only its entire portfolio and therefore can only
choose one level of rj,e v e nw h e na c t i v ei nb o t hr e g i o n s .
The premium income from the fraction of the portfolio that is reinsured is divided as
follows. The insurer keeps a percentage γ to cover administrative costs and passes (1 −
γ) to the reinsurance company. For the remaining portfolio, the insurer keeps the entire
premium income. The reinsurer covers the fraction (1 − rj) of claims payments. In terms of
a particular house in region i, revenue for insurer j from signing a natural disaster insurance
contract can be expressed by the following random variable:
Revj (i)=
½
θγ + rjθ(1 − γ)
θγ + rj [θ(1 − γ) − 1] withprob.
(1 − pi)
pi
The insurer is certain to obtain θγ for each house it has under contract. Further, with
probability (1 − pi) the house does not suﬀer a damage. The insurer then receives the
remaining premium income for the fraction of retained risks (rj). With probability pi the
house is destroyed (damage value equals 1) and “net revenue” to the insurer is the fraction
of remaining premium income minus the fraction of damage that the insurance company
bears.
All costs other than claims payments are assumed to be ﬁxed. However, we consider
two types of ﬁxed costs. A region speciﬁc ﬁxed cost (f) and a country speciﬁc ﬁxed cost
(F). F represents the fact that some costs, such as setting up a countrywide representation,
must be incurred independently of the number of regions covered. Other ﬁxed costs, such
as local branch activities, are speciﬁc to a particular region. For simplicity we assume
that regional ﬁxed costs (f)a r et h es a m ei nb o t hr e g i o n s . 7 The country speciﬁc ﬁxed cost
(F) plays a crucial role in this model. Without it, there is no incentive for an insurer to
serve both regions. In fact, in the absence of F and under a competitive insurance market
characterized by free entry, each individual insurer will seek a homogeneous risk portfolio in
order to choose an optimal rate of retention. Only through the introduction of country ﬁxed
costs might an insurer actually want to provide service in both regions. We will show below
4We work with free-entry equilibria to make the model simple. A high N in the model represents the
substantial proﬁts earned by the French insurers.
5This is an exact model of the proportional reinsurance cover the CCR oﬀered prior to 2001.
6Hence (1 − rj) is the fraction of the portfolio that is reinsured.
7One could argue that administrative costs in the H-regions are higher since there will be, on average,
more cases to evaluate and forms to ﬁll out. We abstract from this.
3that the French institutional setup leads to a tendency for risk selection despite country
ﬁxed costs.
There can be two types of insurers in our model. A specialist (insurer) serves only one





[θγ + rj (θ(1 − γ) − pi)] − f − F, (1)
where N∗
i is the total number of insurers (of both types) operating in region i. Similarly,









[θγ + rj (θ(1 − γ) − pH)] − 2f − F. (2)
Each insurer is assumed to be risk neutral, and hence will choose rj to maximize expected
proﬁts and decide to enter as long as expected proﬁts are positive. This implies that there
can be three candidates of market equilibria.
Deﬁnition 1 i) in a specialist equilibrium (SE), all insurers serve only one region. Such
an equilibrium is characterized by SE(rL;rH),w h e r eri is the rate of retention for specialists
operating in region i.
ii) in a generalist equilibrium (GE), all insurers serve both regions. Such an equilibrium
is characterized by GE (rG).
iii) in a hybrid equilibrium (HE), specialist and generalist insurers coexist. Such an
equilibrium is characterized by HEL(rS;rG) if the specialists operate in the L-region and
by HEH(rS;rG) if the specialists operate in the H-region. rS i st h er a t eo fr e t e n t i o no f
specialists and rG the one for generalists.
Let us start oﬀ by looking at the optimal choice for rj for the insurance companies. The
expression for expected proﬁts is linear in rj, for both the specialist (1) and the generalist
(2) characterization. Hence, the optimal choice of retention will be either zero or one.
Speciﬁcally, from (1) we have for a specialist insurer:
rj =1 if θ(1 − γ) − pi ≥ 0
rj =0 otherwise . (3)
Note that the choice of retention is independent of the number of ﬁrms in the region.
Similarly, using (2) we see that for a generalist insurer we have:
rj =1 if H
N∗
L (θ(1 − γ) − pL)+ H
N∗
H (θ(1 − γ) − pH) ≥ 0
rj =0 otherwise
. (4)
In this case the optimal rate of retention depends on the number of insurers, since it is
potentially diﬀerent across regions. We next turn to each of the equilibrium candidates.
2.2 Equilibrium candidates
Equilibrium candidates are characterized by two factors: the optimal choice of the rate
of retention for each insurer and the number of each type of insurers, which is obtained
by setting the corresponding proﬁt, (1) or (2), equal to zero. Table 1 presents the eight
equilibrium candidates and Appendix A provides more detail on how these candidates are
obtained.
We observe that there exist three candidates for specialist equilibria (SE), one where
specialists in both regions fully reinsure, one where only the insurers in the H-region reinsure
a n do n ew i t hn or e i n s u r a n c ei nb o t hr e g i o n s .T he number of insurers in each market depends
on the equilibrium rate of retention. Similarly, there are two equilibrium candidates for
4generalist equilibria, no reinsurance or full reinsurance. Again the number of insurer varies
according to the rate of retention. Finally, there are three candidates of hybrid equilibria:8
one where generalists fully reinsure and specialists, without reinsuring, operate in the L-
region; one with specialists in the L-region but no reinsurance for either type of ﬁrms;
and one with specialists, fully reinsuring, in the H-region and generalists not reinsuring.
In addition to the number of generalists, Table 1 displays the total number of insurers in
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Appendix A presents comparative statics results of the number of insurance companies
in each equilibrium candidate with respect to the parameters of the model. Generally, the
number of houses (H), the premium rate (θ) and the commission rate (γ) increase the
number of insurers, while the damage probabilities (pi)a n dt h eﬁxed costs (f, F) decrease
the number of them. There are some exceptions to this pattern (as shown in Appendix A),
mainly for the hybrid equilibrium candidates, where a change in a parameter also implies a




Having described equilibrium candidates we now determine under which conditions these
are Nash equilibria.9
For this we explore whether, and under which conditions, a single insurer has an incen-
tive to deviate from its candidate equilibrium strategy, under the assumption that all the
other insurers play the equilibrium strategies. Note that the set of possible deviations is
not very large. Retiring from the market is never a proﬁtable deviation, since equilibria
8Appendix A explains why other potential characterizations such as HEL(rS =0 ;rG =0 )are in fact
not equilibrium candidates.
9Any equilibria we describe below are Nash.
5are characterized by zero expected proﬁts. Deviation strategies are deﬁned by entering or
retiring from a particular region choosing the optimal rate of retention.10 In particular, we
have the following deviation strategies: i) in a specialist equilibrium the deviating insurer
will want to serve both regions, ii) in a generalist equilibrium the deviating insurer will
specialize in the L-region and iii) in a HEL a generalist will deviate by specializing into
the H-region, while in a HEH a generalist will deviate by specializing into the L-region.
Appendix B provides a detailed description of these equilibrium conditions. The results are
displayed in Table 2.
The second column in Table 2 indicates the rate of retention (rD) chosen by the deviating
insurer. Note that in most equilibrium candidates this choice is uniquely determined by the
conditions which must hold for the equilibrium candidate. Only in the SE(rL =1 ; rH =
0) and GE (rG =0 )is it possible that the rate of retention rD c a nb eb o t hz e r oo ro n e ,
depending on parameter values. The last two columns indicate the conditions under which
deviation is not proﬁtable for each of the regions. Thus, for the specialist equilibrium
candidates there is a condition that must hold in each region. In the generalist equilibrium,
since deviation is into the L-region, the condition must only hold in the L-region. Similarly,
for the HELcandidates deviation is to specialize into the H-region, thus the condition must
hold in this region and inversely for the HEH candidate.
For the sake of completeness, Table 2 also includes conditions that must hold such that
at least one insurer is active in the market.
To sum up, three conditions must hold for a candidate to be an equilibrium. First, the
choice of the rate of retention of the candidate must indeed be optimal according to (3)
and (4). Second, the corresponding equilibrium condition displayed in Table 2 must hold.
Third, the condition that at least one insurer is active in the market must also hold.
3.2 Areas of equilibrium
We can describe these equilibrium conditions graphically. This tool will also help us to
illustrate the analysis of an increase in the premium rate. For this we introduce the concepts
of “switch” and “jump” lines.
Deﬁnition 2 Switch lines are deﬁned by situations where either (3) or (4) hold with equal-
ity. They are represented by ri in the graphs, where i corresponds to the type of ﬁrm.
Jump-lines are deﬁned by a situation such that a particular equilibrium condition holds
with equality. These lines are represented by J (rH;rL;rD) f o rs p e c i a l i s te q u i l i b r i a ,J (rG;rD)
for generalist equilibria and J (rS;rG;rD) for hybrid equilibria.
Intuitively, switch lines indicate where an individual insurer will “switch” regime from
zero to full retention. Similarly, jump lines indicate when a single insurer will “jump” from
the actual equilibrium conﬁguration. In a broader sense, by crossing these lines we change
from one equilibrium characterization to another.
These graphical devices allow us to illustrate the area of equilibria for particular parame-
ter values, deﬁned by the area where a single insurer does neither want to switch retention
regime nor wants to jump to another equilibrium conﬁguration. For the graphical analysis,





10Note that the set of relevant deviation strategies is ﬁnite due to risk neutrality, even though the strategy
space is not.
6Table 2




in L-region or cond. on
minimum number of insurers
Nash-equilibrium condition
in H-region
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) 0 Hθγ
Hθγ+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
Hθγ
Hθγ+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
















H(θ−pL)+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Case 2 1 H(θ−pH)
















SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) 1 H(θ−pH)
H(θ−pH)+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
H(θ−pL)
H(θ−pL)+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
GE (rG =0 )
Case 1 0 always Nash
GE (rG =0 )






















HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) 0 f −
θγ
(θ−pL) (f + F) ≤ 0
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) 1 always Nash
HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) 1
f −
(θ−pH)
θγ (f + F) ≤ 0
Min. number
in SE Hθγ ≥ (f + F)
Min. number




in HE Hθγ ≥ 2(f + F)
7Figure 1 illustrates the area of diﬀerent types of equilibria under a set of parameter
values in the (θ, pH)-space.11 Each graph includes the relevant jump- and switch-lines for
a given equilibrium candidate. These lines, together with the minimum-number-of-ﬁrms
condition determine the (shaded) area of equilibrium. A more detailed description of the
graphical analysis can be found in Appendix B.
We observe that a GE (rG =0 )equilibrium can only exist for low premium rates and
rather small diﬀerences in the damage probability.12 Similarly, a GE (rG =1 )is sustained
with high premium rates and small diﬀerences in the damage probabilities. Thus, as men-
tioned above, the introduction of country speciﬁc ﬁxed costs is not suﬃcient to generate an
outcome of insurers oﬀering in both regions. In fact, the cost of not being able to adjust the
rate of retention optimally when oﬀering in both regions outweighs the beneﬁt of “diluting”
the country ﬁxed cost, at least for intermediate and high diﬀerences in damage probabilities
across the regions.
Quite intuitively, the opposite occurs for the SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 ) . This equilibrium
will be sustained in cases where there are important diﬀerences in the damage probabilities
and for intermediate values of the premium rate. In such cases, insurers prefer to have a
homogeneous risk portfolio, even though they have to support the full country ﬁxed cost.
The HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )is an equilibrium for intermediate values of both the premium
rate and the diﬀerence in damage probabilities, while the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) can be
s u s t a i n e db o t hw i t hl o wa n dh i g hd i ﬀerences in the damage probabilities for suﬃciently
high premium rates. Finally, a HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 )requires intermediate premium rates
and rather important diﬀerences in the damage probabilities.
Appendix B also presents a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium areas with respect to
the relative weight of the two ﬁxed costs. Quite intuitively, we observe that relatively high
country ﬁxed costs expand the equilibrium areas of the generalist and hybrid equilibria,
while relatively high regional ﬁxed costs expand the area of the SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )and
(for the parameter values chosen) make a SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )possible.
Figure 2 presents the diﬀerent equilibrium areas jointly. To reduce the number of areas,
the area for a GE (rG =1 )has been omitted, as well as the condition on the minimum
number of ﬁrms.
11The types of equilibria not displayed in Figure 1 do not exist under the chosen set of parameter values.
12Note that, due to the speciﬁcation of a mean preserving spread of pL, pH around p,ah i g hpH in the
graph implies a low pL.
8Figure 1
Areas of equilibrium
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
9Figure 2
Joint areas of equilibrium
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
We see that for each point in the graph there exists at least one equilibrium. In fact,
our model satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 8.D.3 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995) and hence we have existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Further we observe that
some equilibrium areas overlap. Particularly the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )is embedded in the
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )area and the GE (rG =0 )area. The intuition behind this overlap is that
the number of insurers in the market can be such that one or the other equilibrium occurs.
For example, in the area of overlap of the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )and the GE (rG =0 )we
have that the number of insurers is higher in the generalist equilibrium. Loosely speaking,
we will end up with a generalist equilibrium if “many” insurers decide to enter the market.
3.3 Situation under redistributive premium rates
We next brieﬂy explore the outcome of our model if the premium rate is chosen with a goal
of redistribution between high and low probability regions. The feature of a unique premium
rate within the country, without distinguishing diﬀerent, regional risk exposition is a clear
indication that the French legislator willingly imposed a certain redistribution among high
and low risk areas. It is therefore informative to analyze what the outcomes are in our model
when the low risk areas subsidize damage payments in more exposed areas. Formally, we
assume pL < θ <p H to represent a redistributive premium rate. Further, we assume that
the premium rate is chosen such that
θ(1 − γ) − pL + θ(1 − γ) − pH ≥ 0.
10This additional assumption ensures that if all houses where reinsured the reinsurance
company would at least break even.
In such a situation only few of the candidates are actually potential equilibria. First of
all, using (3) and the assumptions on the redistributive premium rate, we can observe that
for specialist insurers: rL =1and rH =0 . This directly eliminates the SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )
and SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 )as equilibrium candidates. Further, due to θ <p H we have that
the equilibrium conditions for SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )Case 2 are always satisﬁed. Finally,
conditions in SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )Case 1 remain unchanged.
Regarding the generalist equilibrium candidates we observe that our assumptions on the
redistributive premium rate implies that only GE(rG =1 )is a valid candidate. However,
in that case the equilibrium condition is never satisﬁed, such that no generalist equilibrium
exists.
Lastly, the only hybrid equilibrium characterization that is a potential equilibrium is
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) . The other characterizations are ruled out by redistributive premium
rates.
Remark 3 Under the realistic assumption of redistributive premium rates across the coun-
try, we observe that only a few of our equilibrium candidates are actually potential equilibria.
Note especially that no generalist equilibrium is possible under redistributive premium rates.
Thus, the model clearly illustrates the tendency towards risk selection of the institutional
setup.
4E ﬀect of an increase in the premium rate
The eﬀect of an increase in the premium rate should not be summarized in a simple com-
parative statics exercise. In general, (marginally) increasing the premium rate would not
alter the situation in the market. As shown in Appendix A, increasing the premium rate
w o u l di no u rm o d e ll e a dt oa ni n c r e a s e dn u m b e ro fﬁrms under each speciﬁct y p eo fe q u i -
librium. Much more interestingly, discrete increases in θ might provoke dramatic changes
in the market structure in the sense that the type of insurers serving each region might
change. From the graphical analysis above we have seen that changes in the premium rate
can easily lead to a situation where the situation after the change is a diﬀerent type of equi-
librium. Analyzing discrete changes are in line with the decision of the French authorities
when increasing the premium rate by 30%.
Our graphical tools are useful for this analysis. We describe sequences of the equilibrium
outcome for diﬀerent levels of the premium rate. Naturally, one can think of several diﬀerent
initial situations. We chose to examine sequences starting from a generalist equilibrium with
full reinsurance and varying degrees of diﬀerences in damage probabilities across regions. In
such a situation, three potential sequences can be found.13 These sequences are illustrated
in Figure 3.14
Proposition 4 Starting from a generalist equilibrium with full reinsurance, the eﬀect of an
increase in the premium rate leads to the following sequences:
i) small diﬀerence in damage probabilities =⇒ GE (rG =0 )→ GE (rG =1 ) .
ii) intermediate diﬀerence in damage probabilities =⇒ GE (rG =0 )→
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )→ SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )→ HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) .
iii) large diﬀerence in damage probabilities =⇒ GE (rG =0 )→ SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )→
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) .
13Theoretically there could be a sequence involving a jump into a HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) . However, as
shown above, deviation from a GE implies specialization into the L-region, hence such a sequence could not
be triggered by the deviation of a single insurer.
14The areas of equilibrium indicated in the graph do not necessarily correspond to the full area of each
type of equilibrium.
11Figure 3
Equilibrium Sequences with increase in premium rate
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
12Starting from a GE with small diﬀerences in the damage probabilities across the high
and low regions, an increase in the premium rate corresponds to moving up along the vertical
line starting from point A.W eo b s e r v et h a tas u ﬃcient increase in the premium rate implies
as w i t c hi nt h er e t e n t i o nr e g i m e( p o i n tB).
I nt h ec a s eo fi n t e r m e d i a t ed i ﬀerences in damage probabilities, the initial starting equi-
librium can be illustrated by point C.A s u ﬃcient increase implies that we jump to a
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) , illustrated by point D. Choosing an even higher premium rate im-
plies a specialist equilibrium of the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )type (point E). Finally, with even
further increases we end up in a HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 )(point F).
In the case of large diﬀerences in damage probabilities, the sequence is similar to that
described above. The diﬀerence is that the passage via the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )area is
bypassed. In this case the market conﬁguration changes directly from a generalist to a
specialist equilibrium (passage from point G to H). Further increases of the premium rate
imply again a HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 )(point I).
Remark 5 Starting from a generalist equilibrium conﬁguration with a low premium rate, we
o b s e r v et h a to n l yo n eo ft h et h r e es e q u e n c e sf o l l o w i n gi n c r e a s e si nt h ep r e m i u mr a t ei n v o l v e s
no risk selection. In fact, only with small diﬀerences of damage probabilities can generalist
equilibria be sustained for all choices of the premium rate. As soon as the diﬀerences in
probabilities exceed a certain threshold, suﬃcient increases in the premium rate imply partial
or full risk selection. Furthermore, we observe that neither sequence ii) nor iii) ever return
to a generalist equilibrium.
Obviously, this result has important consequences for the ﬁnancial situation of the rein-
surance company. An increase in the premium rate does not necessarily leave the market
structure unchanged, and thus improve the situation of the reinsurer. The implied changes
in market structure might actually make the situation worse.
5P r o ﬁts of the reinsurance company
In our model, the position of the reinsurer is obviously very weak. It is a direct result
of risk neutral insurers that expected proﬁts of the reinsurance company are negative in
equilibrium. This (unrealistic) property would obviously change if one were to work with
risk averse insurers.15 Bearing this in mind, one can nevertheless gain useful insights from
our model regarding the relative change in expected proﬁts with changes in the premium
rate.
Table 3 indicates the expressions for expected proﬁts in decreasing order of expected
proﬁts for the reinsurance company in the diﬀerent potential equilibria.
Table 3
Expected proﬁts of the reinsurance company
Equilibria Expected proﬁt( πR)
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) , GE (rG =1 ) ,
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) 0
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) , GE (rG =0 ) H[(θ(1 − γ) − pL)+( θ(1 − γ) − pH)] < 0
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )
NG
NS+NGH(θ(1 − γ) − pL)
+H(θ(1 − γ) − pH) < 0
HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) NS
NS+NGH(θ(1 − γ) − pH) < 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) H(θ(1 − γ) − pH) < 0
15See the next section for a discussion.
13Three equilibria (SE(rL =1 ; rH =1 ) , GE (rG =1 ) , HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) )h a v en o
role for the reinsurer. Next, under the GE (rG =0 )and SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )we have full
reinsurance, and hence the reinsurer obtains both the “good” and the “bad” risks. Under
a HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )the reinsurer also gets both typeso fr i s k s . H o w e v e r ,i nt h i sc a s e
only a fraction of the houses in the low probability region are reinsured. Finally, in the
HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 )and SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )the reinsurer gets only “bad” risks. While
it is only a fraction of bad risks in the HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 )it is the full portfolio of high
damage houses in the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) .
Table 4 presents the comparative statics with respect to the premium rate.
Table 4
Comparative statics with respect to the premium rate
Equilibria ∂πR
∂θ
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) , GE (rG =1 ) ,
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) 0
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) , GE (rG =0 ) 2H(1 − γ) > 0






∂θ H(θ(1 − γ) − pL)
+ NG
NS+NGH(1 − γ)+H(1 − γ) > 0






∂θ H(θ(1 − γ) − pH)
+ NS
NS+NGH(1 − γ) > 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) H(1 − γ) > 0
We note that, not considering eventual changes in the equilibrium characterization, a
(marginal) increase in the premium rate decreases expected losses for the reinsurance com-
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SE(rL=1;rH=0)
.17
This ordering is intuitive. When the reinsurer has the full portfolio, the eﬀect of an
increase in the premium rate is strongest. For equilibrium outcomes with more and more
risk selection, the reinsurer “loses” part or all of the good risks, and thus the eﬀect of
an increase in the premium rate becomes less eﬀective. In other words, if increasing the
premium rate aims at improving the situation of the reinsurer, then this policy is less eﬀective
in situations with a high degree of risk selection.
As mentioned above, a comparative statics exercise does not give us the full picture of
the eﬀect of an increase in the premium rate. One must also include the eﬀect of the changes
in equilibrium structure, which were outlined with the sequences of equilibrium. This eﬀect
is twofold: ﬁrst, a higher degree of risk selection implies that the slope of the reinsurer’s
expected proﬁts is reduced, and, second, the change in the portfolio of the reinsurer can
imply drops in expected proﬁts.
This is illustrated in Figure 4 displaying the expected proﬁts of the reinsurer as a function






∂θ and H(θ(1 − γ) − pH) < 0 and hence the positive derivative for the






















> H(1 − γ).
14diﬀerence between the sequences displayed is the diﬀerence between the damage probability
in the H and L-region. In particular, overall expected damages (Hp) are identical for all
sequences. In sequence i) (the change of retention regime within a generalist equilibrium)
the transition from one type of equilibrium to another is smooth and occurs at zero expected
proﬁts for the reinsurer.
Figure 4







































Parameter values: H =1 0 0 ,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05. pH =0 .0525 for sequence
i), pH =0 .065 for sequence ii) and pH =0 .08 for sequence iii).
For sequence ii), the passage from the GE (rG =0 )to the HEL(rS =1 ; rG =0 )implies
a change of slope (point I). Further, at point II, the passage from the HEL(rS =1 ; rG =0 )
to the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) , expected proﬁts drop ﬁrst and then increase at an even lower
rate. Finally, for sequence iii) there exists an early drop and change in slope of expected
proﬁts, when changing from the GE (rG =0 )to a SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )(point III).
The graph illustrates that the tendency to risk selection can have important eﬀects for
the situation of the reinsurance company. For example, given our parameter values, for a
premium rate of 0.06, corresponding to a situation where the reinsurer almost breaks even,
expected losses are more than four times larger with partial risk selection (sequence ii)),
and eight times larger with complete risk selection (sequence iii)).
6 Discussion
Within the more general discussion we want to address the following issues: 1) the evolution
of the rate of reinsurance and proﬁts in France; 2) the “social” cost of increasing the premium
rate; 3) regions of diﬀerent size; 4) risk-averse insurance companies; 5) introduction of a risk-
pool transfer scheme as observed for some health insurance systems.
156.1 The evolution of the rate of reinsurance and proﬁts in France
Our model, based on the institutional setup in France, predicts that an increase in the
premium rate is likely to lead to an increased degree of risk selection, which in turn, generally,
reduces the average rate of reinsurance. Table 5 illustrates this result.18 It displays the
evolution of the rate of reinsurance from the beginning of the system in 1982/83 to 1997.19
This period includes an initial raise in the premium rate occurring after 1984. In the
years after this ﬁrst premium increase, the rate of reinsurance decreased from close to
100% to 40%. Obviously, this could simply be an indication that the premium rate is
on average “comfortably” high, such that the insurance companies need not reinsure fully.
Unfortunately, data on the amount of risk selection is not available. Von Ungern provides
some factual evidence stating that “(i)n 1995, the share of premiums ceded to the CCR was
45 percent. In the same year, the CCR had to pay 98 per cent of the damage caused by the
three hurricanes in the DOM. With a premium volume of F24m (from the DOM), the CCR
had to pay claims in the order of F650m...” (von Ungern (2004), p.91).
Table 5











82/83 83 -1.4 1.6
84 75 0.5 1.9
85 75 3.2 2.2
86 73 5.9 2.2
87 52 8.2 1.8
88 41 10.1 1.5
89 51 13.3 1.5
90 43 14.0 1.5
91 40 17.4 1.5
92 38 19.7 1.5
93 41 20.8 1.7
94 41 24.4 1.9
95 45 26.5 2.1
96 39 29.0 2.0
97 40 33.5 2.1
Source: von Ungern (2004).
The model also predicts that the reinsurance company cannot beneﬁtf r o mt h ep r o ﬁts
generated in the system. This is also illustrated in Table 5 representing an estimation of
the aggregate proﬁts of the system as well as the evolution of revenues of the CCR. In the
period 1982-1997 the system (and mainly the private insurers) accumulated an estimated
33,5 billion French Francs. At the same time, premium income of the CCR remained fairly
stable over time, leading to the already mentioned need of reﬁnancing of the reinsurer.
6.2 The “social” cost of increasing the premium rate
Our model allows us to calculate the “social” cost of the system. This cost is the sum of
the expected losses of the reinsurer and the premium payments of the ﬁnal consumers.20
18Data in this Table are drawn from von Ungern (2004).
19Recall that starting in 1999, the CCR only allowed a maximum of 50% reinsurance.
20Recall that proﬁts of the insurance companies are zero by the determination of equilibrium. Further,
this is not a measure of “net welfare” as the (exogenous) cost of damage is not considered.
16Note that, given the unique premium rate, the direct cost of insurance to ﬁnal customers is
simply 2Hθ, i.e. the number of houses in the country times the premium rate.
Figure 5 illustrates the social cost as a function of the premium rate for the three
equilibrium sequences deﬁned. First of all, the ﬁgure illustrates that improving the situation
of the reinsurance company by increasing the premium rate comes at an important cost to
the taxpayer (and ﬁnal consumer). This eﬀect is accentuated (higher slope of the social cost
curve) with more risk selection. Finally, we observe that bigger diﬀerences in the damage
probabilities, sequences ii) and iii), might imply considerably higher social costs.
Figure 5







































i) ii) iii) Full reinsurance
Parameter values: H =1 0 0 ,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05. pH =0 .0525 for sequence
i), pH =0 .065 for sequence ii) and pH =0 .08 for sequence iii).
One should not overemphasize this simple welfare calculation. For one thing we do not
include an analysis of why this institutional framework was chosen. Presumably, there is
some beneﬁt from the fact that a public reinsurance company exists, even if it generates
losses. Our positive framework does not allow us to address the issue of the optimal insti-
tutional setup. For this, one would have to build a more complex model, which takes into
account the preferences of the consumers.
However, we can analyze a situation where the private insurance companies are obliged
to fully reinsure, and hence act as pure intermediaries. Figure 5 includes the social cost of
such a system (the dashed-dotted line). Clearly, this simple change in the setup implies an
important reduction of the total cost of the system. We can distinguish two eﬀects that
diﬀerentiate a policy of full reinsurance from the current institutional setup. First, when
risk selection occurs, the social cost of the system increases much more strongly than under
full reinsurance. Second, at a certain point the reinsurer actually makes positive proﬁts and
thus dampens the eﬀect of higher premium rates.
176.3 Diﬀerent sized regions
Next we want to include diﬀerent sized regions. It is easy to introduce diﬀerent sizes of
regions (see Appendix C), where it is realistic to assume that the L-region is bigger than
the H-region.21
One might think that a bigger L-region would attenuate the problems outlined in our
model. Thus, since an ap r i o r ioverlook of the distribution of low and high damage prob-
ability areas in France would lead to the impression that the L-region is much bigger, one
would be tempted to dismiss our results as hinging crucially on the identical size of the
regions.
This is not the case. In fact, a bigger L-region might make things worse for the reinsur-
ance company. Especially under a constant average damage probability, the consequences
from risk selection are even more devastating, since now the reinsurance company must
support a high fraction of total damages while only reinsuring a small part of the country
housing stock.
Appendix C shows that the tendencies to risk selection persist virtually unchanged under
diﬀerent size regions. In a similar vein, Figure 6 below represents the total social cost of the
system under a bigger L-region. For the example, we assume that the L-region is 10 times
the size of the H-region and take slightly diﬀerent values for pH. The other parameters, in
particular p remain unchanged. Sequences a) and b) in the ﬁgure are similar to sequences
ii) and iii) above. See Appendix C for details.
Figure 6







































a) b) Full reinsurance
Parameter values: ML =1 ,000,000; MH = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
pH =0 .06 for sequence a), pH =0 .15 for sequence b).
21For clarity there is a slight change in notation in Appendix A3. The housing stock in region i is denoted
by Mi (for maison).
18The illustration shows that the problems of risk selection and their consequences on the
cost of the system are present also under diﬀerent size regions. In order to illustrate the
additional costs causes by the risk selection we again included the cost of the system under
the assumption that reinsurance is compulsory.
6.4 Risk averse insurance companies
In this section we sketch a modiﬁcation of the model to introduce risk-averse insurers. This
implies interior solutions for the choice of the rate of retention. However, even though
we introduce risk aversion in the simplest possible way, the model becomes intractable
analytically, particularly for hybrid equilibrium situations.
We return to the initial model with equally sized regions. The setup is identical to the
one outlined before, with the modiﬁcation that insurers maximize expected utility





















pH (1 − pH)
¸
for generalists, choosing their rate of retention rj. Before describing the equilibrium
candidates, it is useful to introduce some further notation. We denote by ωij the “risk-
adjusted unitary proﬁt” for insurer j in region i
ωij =
·




2 pi (1 − pi)
¸
.
Equilibrium candidates are displayed in Table 6.22
Table 6
Risk-averse insurers: Equilibrium candidates
Eqm. candidate
Type























Note: The displayed expression for the number of insurers corresponds to an interior solution for the rate
of retention.
As for the main model, the next step is to derive conditions under which a given candidate
is indeed an equilibrium. Since the candidate characterization for the hybrid equilibrium is
not tractable, it is not possible to obtain analytical conditions in this case. One would have
to proceed to a simulation exercise. For this reason we restrict the analysis to specialist
22The number of insurers in the HEL speciﬁcation is not a tractable expression, and thus is omitted in
the table. For brevity we did not consider other types of hybrid equilibria.
19and generalist equilibria. The equilibrium conditions are displayed in Table 7, recall the
deviation strategy (D) for a specialist candidate is to oﬀer in both regions, while it is to
retreat to the L-region for the generalist candidate.
Table 7


















ωG (2f + F) − f − F<0
As for the model with linear utility we observe that some conditions must be satisﬁed
for a speciﬁc candidate to be an equilibrium. Thus, as before, a discrete increase in the
premium rate might imply a change in the equilibrium conﬁg u r a t i o na n dl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s e
in risk-selection, with the already explained consequences for the ﬁnancial situation of the
reinsurer. Thus the conclusions of this more general model would be essentially the same as
for the model with risk-neutral insurers. The main diﬀerence in the results for the reinsurer
is that its problems are somewhat attenuated, since for suﬃcient risk-aversion expected
proﬁt of the reinsurer might actually be positive.
6.5 Risk-pool transfer scheme
So far we have considered one simple “mechanism” to improve the ﬁnancial situation of the
reinsurance company via the introduction of compulsory reinsurance. We have shown that
such a scheme would signiﬁcantly reduce the social cost of the system. Below we want to
sketch an alternative; the introduction of a risk pool similar to the ones often encountered
in health insurance. Generally, a risk pool is a mechanism to redistribute premium income
from insurers with a good risk portfolio to insurers with a bad one.
We model the risk-pool as a payment (rp) for each good risk (i.e. insurance contract in
the L-region). The payment rp is transferred to the reinsurance company, and is set such
that the latter brakes even.





[θγ − rp+ rj (θ(1 − γ) − pi)] − f − F,









[θγ + rj (θ(1 − γ) − pH)] − 2f − F,
for a generalist. Note that expected proﬁt for a specialist in the H-region are still given
by (1), and the choice of the rate of retention for any insurer by (3) and (4). Similarly,
expected proﬁts of the reinsurer for the diﬀerent equilibrium candidates are still given by
the expressions in Table 3 adding Hrp to each expression.
Equilibrium candidates are now characterized by a system of equations considering the
zero-proﬁt conditions for each type of insurer in the candidate and, additionally, by the zero
expected proﬁt condition for the reinsurer to determine rp.
Descriptions of the equilibrium candidates are displayed in Table 8.23
23Since the risk-pool does not aﬀect the H-region, the expressions for the number of insurers in this region
are identical to the ones in Table 1.
20Table 8






SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )
H[θ−pL+θ(1−γ)−pH]
(f+F)
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
H[θ−pL+θ(1−γ)−pL]
(f+F)
GE (rG =0 )
H[θ−pL+θ−pH]
(2f+F)
Equilibrium candidates where there is no reinsurance are not displayed, since in this case
rp =0and the expressions are as in Table 1. Further, the hybrid equilibrium expressions
are messy and are thus not displayed either. We observe similar expressions for the number
of insurers as in our basic model. The main diﬀerence is that, in general, the number of
insurers operating in the L-region is lower, due to the additional ﬁnancing of the reinsurer.
From here the analysis is essentially the same as for the basic model, i.e. one could again
deﬁne areas of equilibrium with the consequence that an discrete increase in the premium
rate may lead to a change in the equilibrium conﬁguration with an increase in risk-selection.
All this is not needed to consider the social cost of such a system, since by construction
expected proﬁts of both the insurers and the reinsurer are zero. Hence, social cost is now
determined uniquely by the cost to ﬁnal customers. However, it should be mentioned that
the risk-pool scheme is only feasible for premium rates that satisfy
(θ − pL)+( θ − pH) > 0,
since, without this condition the number of insurers would become negative.
Figure 7 takes up Figure 5 and includes the social cost of the risk-pool scheme. Quite
intuitively, the slope of the risk-pool scheme is the highest and coincides with the segments
of the above mentioned sequences for situations where there is no reinsurance. In this sense,
the risk pool has (weakly) lower costs than the current situation of free choice of reinsurance,
whenever the risk-pool is feasible. Further, we can also detect a range of premium rate (in
our case between 0.05 and slightly more than 0.06), where the risk-pool scheme is also better
than the alternative of full reinsurance.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Natural disaster insurance has recently come back into the policy agenda due to increased
occurrence and severity of ﬂoods and other catastrophes. The situation in France merits
particular attention because of some stylized facts one can observe. Although the system is
ﬁnancially viable (the claims/premium ratio since introduction of the insurance is around
55%), the existing, publicly owned, reinsurance company (Caisse Centrale de Réassurance
- CCR) was never able to build up vital reserves and had to be recapitalized in 1999. This
injection of public funds was accompanied by an increase in premium rates and excesses of
30%.
Our claim is that this situation is the outcome of ﬂaws in the institutional setup. The
private insurance companies are free to contract reinsurance at any degree with the CCR.
This leads to a situation of risk selection by the insurance companies. Further, the increase
in the premium rates to improve the situation for the ﬁnancially distressed CCR, comes at
a high cost for the tax payer and ﬁnal consumer of the insurance.
21Figure 7



































i) ii) iii) Full reinsurance Risk pool
Parameter values same as in Figure 5.
In order to sustain this claim we build a model that represents the situation of the French
property insurance market. Although the model is kept as simple as possible, we include the
main features of the institutional setup, such as the uniform premium rate across the country
and the existence of a (publicly owned) reinsurer that oﬀers (proportional) reinsurance cover.
The equilibrium outcomes of our model conﬁrms the inherent tendency of risk selection. In
particular, assuming redistributive premium rates, where low damage probability regions
subsidize high damage probability regions, no equilibrium where all insurance companies
serve the whole country (“generalist equilibrium”) can exist. Further, we ﬁnd that a higher
premium rate is likely to increase the tendency for risk selection. Note that the increase in
risk selection is not gradual. Rather, a suﬃcient increase in the premium rate eventually
leads to a change in the equilibrium market conﬁguration, one with a higher degree of risk
selection.
These changes in equilibrium conﬁguration have their eﬀect on the reinsurer. While a
marginal increase in the premium rate improves the expected proﬁts of the reinsurer, this
eﬀect is dampened with a higher degree of risk selection. When calculating the “social”
cost of the system, which is deﬁned as the sum of (ﬁnal) consumer premium payments
and expected proﬁts (losses) of the reinsurer, we show that the current institutional setup
leads to high social cost. In particular, social costs of the current setup are (in general)
signiﬁcantly higher than in a situation where all insurers are obliged to fully reinsure and
act as pure intermediaries.
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A Determination of equilibrium candidates
Below we describe in some more detail the determination of the equilibrium candidates for
each of the equilibrium deﬁn e di nt h et e x t .
Specialist equilibrium candidates
Due to the discrete optimal rate of retention we can distinguish three characterizations
of a potential specialist equilibrium:
Characterization θ(1 − γ) − pL θ(1 − γ) − pH
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) <0 <0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) >0 <0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) >0 >0
In each case the equilibrium number of ﬁrms will be determined by setting (1) equal to
zero and solving for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. Denoting by NS
i the number of ﬁrms




















For the generalist equilibrium candidates there are only two characterizations according
to (4). The equilibrium number of ﬁrms, denoted by NG, is determined by setting (2) equal
to zero:
Eqm. Candidate NG
GE (rG =0 )
2Hθγ
(2f+F)




In a so called hybrid equilibrium candidate (HE) the choice of the rate of retention will
again be determined by (3) and (4), respectively.24
The equilibrium number of insurers is obtained by a zero-proﬁt condition for each type of
ﬁrm, using (1) and (2). Note that we must distinguish between HELand HEH candidates.
For example, in a HEH characterization the conditions to determine the number of each
type of insurer are:
E [πS]= H
N∗
H [θγ + rS (θ(1 − γ) − pH)] − f − F =0
E [πG]= H
NG [θγ + rG (θ(1 − γ) − pL)]
+ H
N∗
H [θγ + rG (θ(1 − γ) − pH)] − 2f − F =0
where πS and πG are proﬁts of the specialists and generalists, respectively, and N∗
H =
NS + NG is the total number of insurers operating in the H- r e g i o n( a n da l s ot h et o t a l
number of ﬁrms in the country). Again, we must consider the four cases of possible rates of
retention.
Below we present the equilibrium number of insurers for the hybrid equilibrium can-
didates when the specialists operate in the L-region and the H-region. We indicate the
total as well as the generalist number of insurers. The number of specialists can easily be
obtained by diﬀerence. Note that the table only excludes situations, denoted by (-), where




HEL(rS =0 ;rG =0 ) − −








































HEH(rS =0 ;rG =0 ) − −
































HEH(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) − −
We observe that a HE candidate with a rate of retention of zero is not possible. In fact,
under such a situation the number of specialists would be negative. This result is quite
intuitive, under zero retention an insurer which operates in both regions has an advantage
over an insurer specializing in one region, since it can “dilute” the country ﬁxed costs. Note
further, that within the HEH(rS =1 ;rG =1 )candidate there is additionally no possibility
of a situation with full retention. Again in this case the number of specialist ﬁrms would be
negative.
24One could imagine a hybrid equilibrium with three type of ﬁrms: specialist in either region and gen-
eralists. However, for the characterization of such an equilibrium a condition, which is independent of the
number of ﬁrms of any type, must hold. We do not consider this particular case.
25We therefore, so far, do not rule out potential negative numbers of ﬁrms under certain parameter values.
We will introduce this restriction later on in the analysis.
24Next we must check whether the potential equilibrium characterizations are feasible in
the sense that there exist situations where the rate of retention of the equilibrium character-
ization indeed is an optimal choice for the reinsurer. If this is not the case, we can eliminate
further candidates.
For example, within the HEL(rS =0 ;rG =1 )characterization we have that rS =0 .
This implies for an optimal choice, from (3), that θ(1 − γ)−pL < 0. Hence, under pH >p L
we also have θ(1 − γ) − pH < 0, which implies using (4), that rG =1 , is never an optimal
choice. We are thus able to exclude the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 )candidate. For the other two
cases there are no restrictions that would render them a priori infeasible.
An inverse reasoning shows that the HEH(rS =1 ;rG =0 )candidate is not feasible.
Indeed, rS =1implies θ(1 − γ) − pH > 0, which implies that the optimal choice for a
generalist is rG =1 . Thus we can also eliminate this characterization.









































Comparative statics of the equilibrium characterizations
Table A-1 below summarizes the comparative statics eﬀects of the parameters in the
model on the number of insurers in each equilibrium candidate26. Results are in general
straightforward and intuitive. The only somewhat diﬀerent eﬀects occur in the hybrid
equilibrium candidates. There we observe that some derivatives cannot be signed, or have
the opposite sign as the ones observed for the specialist and generalist candidates. This
is due to the fact that one type of insurer can “beneﬁt” from an increase in one of the
parameters at the cost of the other type in the equilibrium. Generally, the pattern is the
following: the number of houses (H), the premium rate (θ) as well as the commission rate
(γ)h a v eap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on the number of insurers, while the damage probabilities (pi)
and ﬁxed costs have a negative eﬀect. As exceptions to these eﬀects we can note that the
damage probability in the L-region aﬀects positively the number of generalist ﬁrms in a
HEL(rS =1 ,r G =0 )situation. Whereas for the same candidate the rate of commissions
(γ)a ﬀects negatively the number of specialists. The eﬀect of an increase in the premium
rate for this candidate is ambiguous. Further, note that the damage probabilities have a
positive eﬀect on the number of specialists in the HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 )candidate.
26Note that the eﬀect of an increase in the premium rate (θ) is further analyzed in a subsequent section.
25Table A-1




ﬁrm H θ pL pH γ f,( F)
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) NL > > 0 0 > <
NH > > 0 0 > <
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) NL > > < 0 0 <
NH > > 0 0 > <
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) NL > > < 0 0 <
NH > > 0 < 0 <
GE (rG =0 ) NG > > 0 0 > <
GE (rG =1 ) NG > > < < 0 <
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) NG > ≶ > 0 > <
NS > ≶ < 0 < ≶
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) NG > > 0 < 0 < (0)
NS ≶ < < > 0 ≶ (<)
HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) NG > ≶ < < ≶ <
NS ≶ ≶ > > ≶ ≶
B Equilibrium conditions
We consider the deviation strategies for the three types of equilibrium: specialist, generalist
and hybrid.
Specialist equilibrium
Under the specialist equilibrium candidates we have separation of markets. We must
consider deviation strategies for the H and the L regions. However, the possible deviations
are of the same kind in both cases. Does an insurer have an incentive to oﬀer in both
regions, choosing its optimal rate of retention given by (4)? It seems intuitive that an
insurer operating in the H-region more likely has an incentive to deviate. For this reason we
concentrate on the situation for a specialist ﬁrm operating in the high probability region.
Below we present the corresponding conditions for a specialist in the L-region. Note that
the deviation implies that the number of market participants does not change in the region
where the insurer was already active, while it increases by one in the other region. For





Further we can distinguish four possible cases that potentially occur, characterized in
the table below. We denote by rD the optimal choice of the rate of retention for a deviation
strategy.
Char. Case rD
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) 1 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 ) 2 1
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) 1
26To obtain the condition under which a deviation is not proﬁtable we compute the ex-
pected proﬁts of a deviating insurer, taking into account the number of ﬁrms in the market.
This expression must be negative, implying the conditions we are looking for.
SE(rL= 0;rH= 0)







θγ − 2f − F<0









− 2f − F<0 (B − 1)
=
Hθγ
Hθγ + f + F
(f + F) − f<0 (5)
If this condition holds, then a typical insurer of a SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )operating in the
H-region, will not have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium characterization27.
SE(rL= 1;rH= 0) Case 1
T h es a m ep r o c e d u r el e a d st ot h ef o l l o w i n gc o n d i t i o n :
E [πD]=
Hθγ
H(θ − pL)+f + F
(f + F) − f<0 (B − 2)
The condition states that deviation is not proﬁtable if generated income from entering
the L-region does not cover the additional regional ﬁxed costs.
SE(rL= 1;rH= 0) Case 2
The condition for this case is somewhat more complicated. Again, determining the ex-
pected proﬁts from deviation, using the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and then manipulating















i < 0 (B − 3)
Note that the term in f is strictly negative. This comes from the fact that here (3)
in the H-region is negative and thus: θ − pH < θγ. On the other hand, the term in F is
potentially positive.
SE(rL= 1;rH= 1)
Finally the condition a in SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 )is given by:
E [πD]=
H(θ − pL)
H(θ − pL)+f + F
(f + F) − f<0 (B − 4)
The corresponding conditions for a specialist in the L-region are the following:
27In this case, as is shown in the appendix, the condition for a L- i n s u r e ri st h es a m e ,s i n c eb o t hh a v et h e
same initial rate of retention.
27Candidate Condition
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )
Hθγ
Hθγ+f+F (f + F) − f<0
















SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Case 2
H(θ−pH)
Hθγ+f+F (f + F) − f<0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 )
H(θ−pH)
H(θ−pH)+f+F (f + F) − f<0
Generalist equilibrium
To determine the conditions under which deviation from a generalist equilibrium can-
didate is not proﬁtable we proceed in the exact same way as for the specialist equilibrium
characterization. Here the potential deviation strategy is to restrict service into one of the
regions. However, we can show that deviation into the high probability region is never
proﬁtable.
Thus, the conditions we must check corresponds to deviation into the L-region, choosing
the rate of retention according to (3). Note that restricting service into one region does
not change the number of insurers active in that particular region. Here we can distinguish
three cases.
Candidate Case rD
GE (rG =0 ) 1 0
GE (rG =0 ) 2 1
GE (rG =1 ) 1
GE(rG = 0) Case 1













− f − F<0
Thus, deviation from a GE (rG =0 )is never proﬁtable. A situation which is quite intu-
itive. Here insurers fully reinsure and the zero proﬁt condition is met with ﬁrms “diluting”
the country ﬁxed cost over two regions. Retiring from one region in such a situation, only
reducing the regional ﬁxed costs, is not proﬁtable.
GE(rG = 0) Case 2
Calculating expected proﬁts from deviating, using the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and













< 0 (B − 5)
28Note that here the term in f is strictly positive, since rD =1implies (θ − pL) > θγ.
GE(rG = 1)














Note again that in this case the term in f is strictly positive. Further it is interesting to
note that in the case of pH > θ, the condition is never satisﬁed, i.e. in a situation where there
is redistribution between the low and the high probability region, a GE (rG =1 )candidate
is never an equilibrium. We will come back to this issue later on.
Hybrid equilibrium
HEL
For these candidates the only possible deviating strategy is to restrict service to the
H-region. In fact, if a specialist would want to become a generalist, then the number of
generalist insurers would increase by one, leading to negative expected proﬁts due to the
zero-proﬁt condition imposed on the characterization. Similarly, if a generalist restricts
service to the L-region the number of insurers in that region does not change. Hence, its
situation becomes identical to the already active specialists in that region, which have zero
expected proﬁts. Finally, note that we can restrict the analysis to generalists. If one of them
deviates, the number of insurers in the H-region does not change, whereas if a specialist
deviates the number of ﬁrms in the market increases making the situation worse.
As we have seen before, there remain two possible candidates for this hybrid equilibrium:
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )and HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) .
In the ﬁrst case, we can show that rG =0implies that θ <p H.T h u s ,t h eo p t i m a lr a t e




− f − F<0




(f + F) < 0
It should be recalled that rS =1implies (θ − pL) > θγ, and thus the condition is not
necessarily negative.
For the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 )we can show that deviation is never proﬁtable.
HEH
Within the hybrid equilibrium candidate where specialists are active in the high proba-
bility region, only one potential case is actually possible. The condition for an equilibrium
in this case can be found in the same way as before. The deviation strategy for a generalist
is to restrict service to the L-region. The condition on the rate of retention for the generalist
implies that (θ − pL) > θγ must hold. Thus the optimal rate of retention for deviation is




− f − F




(f + F) < 0
We can note here that deviation is always proﬁtable in situations where θ <p H.
Minimum number of insurers
Finally, before moving to the next step, we want to restrict the set of equilibria such
that at least one ﬁrm is active in the market. We do this by specifying conditions ensuring
that within the most unfavorable situation there is still at least one ﬁrm in the market. For






=⇒ Hθγ ≥ (f + F)








for the hybrid equilibrium the conditions that at least one ﬁrm of each type is active are







=⇒ Hθγ ≥ 2(f + F)
Note that, quite intuitively, the least restrictive condition is the one on the generalist
equilibrium.
Description of the graphical analysis
Specialist equilibrium
We start with the specialist equilibrium and present only the lines corresponding to
insurers operating in the H-region.28
Figure B-1 below presents the switch-lines for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )in the premium
rate (θ) - high risk area probability (pH) space. The upper increasing line (rh)r e p r e s e n t s
situations where an H-insurer wants to change retention regime. Above rh the premium
rate is favorable enough that the insurer retains all risks (rH =1 ), whereas below the line
the insurer fully reinsures (rH =0 ). Similarly, the lower increasing line (rd)r e p r e s e n t st h e
switch-line for the deviating insurer.29 Again, above rd the deviating insurer chooses full
retention. Finally, the decreasing line (rl) corresponds to the switch-line for an L-insurer,
with full retention above the line. Thus the area for a SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )Case 1 is
delimited above by rd and below by rl. Correspondingly, SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )Case 2 is
delimited above by rh and below by rd.
28We assume that these conditions are more stringent than the ones for insurers in the L-region. Thus
we assume that, at the margin, if an H-insurer wants to proceed to a change an L-ﬁr mw i l ln o tw a n tt od o
so, yet.
29Recall that a deviating insurer from a specialist equilibrium characterization will necessarily choose to be
a generalist. Further, note that by considering H-region conditions, deviation implies that NL = NSE
L +1 .
30Figure B-1
Switch-lines for SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )characterization
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
The relevant jump-lines for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )are presented in Figure B-2. The
increasing line corresponds to the jump-line for SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )Case 1, i.e. situations
where (B − 2) holds with equality. Below the line the equilibrium condition is satisﬁed.
Similarly, the decreasing line represents situations where (B − 3) holds with equality. In
other words, this is the jump-line for SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )Case 2. Here the condition holds
everywhere above the line.
Figure B-3 takes the two graphs together. It allows to determine the area of equilibria
for the particular candidate under study (SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 ) ).30 In our example this
area is principally determined by the relevant jump-lines. However, the switch-lines are also
important because they delimit the range where a speciﬁc jump line is actually relevant.
In order to illustrate this interplay we have included in Figure B-3 the switch-line for the
deviating ﬁrm (rd). In the end, the area of equilibria is determined by the area which is
both below the dotted (J(rL =1 ,r H =0 ,r D =1 ) ) and above the solid line (J(rL =
1,r H =0 ,r D =0 ) ). To get to this conclusion we must consider also the switch-line for the
deviating insurer (rd). Take for example the solid jump-line (J(rL =1 ,r H =0 ,r D =0 ) ).
This line, by deﬁnition is only valid for situation where the deviating insurer chooses a zero
rate of retention, hence situation which are delimited from above by rd.A n y w h e r ee l s et h i s
is not the relevant jump-line. Similar argumentation implies that another part of the area
of equilibria is delimited by J(rL =1 ,r H =0 ,r D =1 )from above and rd from below.
Taking these parts together, we obtain the full (shaded) area of equilibria.
30For clarity the lines irrelevant for equilibrium determination are not drawn.
31Figure B-2
Jump-lines for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
Figure B-3
Equilibrium Area for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
Finally, Figure B-4 includes the last restriction, the fact that at least one insurer should
be active in every region, line denoted by NF.
32Figure B-4
Equilibrium Area for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Including minimum number of insurers
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05.
Similar steps can be applied to obtain the equilibrium area for all the SE-conﬁgurations,
w h i c ha r es h o w ni nt h eﬁrst column of Figure B-5. Note that under our parameter speciﬁ-
cations there are no equilibria of type SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )and SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) , due to
the fact that some conditions are mutually exclusive. For the SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 )it is the
fact that the jump-line and the restriction for the minimum number of ﬁrms coincide, while
for the SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 )the switch and the jump-line delimit exclusive areas.
In the same ﬁgure we have a look at how the “shape” of the equilibrium area changes
under diﬀerent parameter constellations. Of particular interest are changes in the structure
of the ﬁxed costs. For this we specify two alternative scenarios, one where country ﬁxed
costs (F) are high and one where regional ﬁxed costs (f) are high. In both cases we leave
the sum of ﬁxed costs (f +F) identical to the base scenario. Column two and three present
the resulting area of equilibria.
For the SE(rL =0 ; rH =0 )we have that equilibrium is delimited from above the by
the jump-line J (rL =0 ,r H =0 ,r D =0 ) . As mentioned above, there is no equilibrium of
this characterization under the base parameter values. Similarly, a high country ﬁxed cost
(F) does not give an equilibrium, whereas high regional ﬁxed costs (f) imply existence of
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) -type equilibria. This result is quite intuitive, only in situations where
regional ﬁxed costs are high relative to country ﬁxed costs does it make sense to specialize
into one type of market in a situation of full reinsurance. In the other situations it is more
appropriate to oﬀer in both regions, in order to dilute the country ﬁxed cost.
Regarding the SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )(in row two) we can observe that a change in the
relative composition of ﬁxed costs moves the relevant jump-lines around. The result is that
a SE(rL =1 ; rH =0 )equilibrium can be sustained only in case of extreme diﬀerences in
damage probabilities in the case of high F, whereas the area of equilibrium is much bigger
under high f. Again, this result is intuitive in that high country ﬁxed cost provide an
incentive for specialization only in the case of important diﬀerences across the regions.
Finally, under the considered parameter constellations there is no SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 )
equilibrium. Again we observe that changes in the ﬁxed cost composition move around the
jump-line.
33Generalist Equilibrium
Having introduced the diﬀerent concepts we use for the graphical analysis, we can pro-
ceed much quicker for the other two equilibrium characterizations. As before, within the
Generalist Equilibrium candidates, equilibria are determined through the interplay between
the relevant switch- and jump-lines. Figure B-6 presents these results for the two candidates
of GE (GE (rG =0 ) , GE (rG =1 ) ). The ﬁgure also includes the eﬀects of a change in the
relative composition of ﬁxed costs.
A b o v ew eh a v es h o w nt h a taGE (rG =0 )with rD =0is always an equilibrium. Since,
in our case rD = rL, we have that all points below the rl line are Generalist Equilibria,
except for the restriction on the minimum number of insurers. Further, points below the
jump-line for GE (rG =0 )are also part of the area of equilibria. Finally, note that here an
increase in the relative magnitude of F implies an increase in the area of equilibrium.
For the GE (rG =1 )we have that situations with high premium rates and little dif-
ferences in damage probabilities constitute an equilibrium. Again the area of equilibria
expands when F is relatively high and contracts for high f.
Hybrid Equilibrium
Figure B-7 presents the area of equilibrium for the three HE candidates (HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) ,
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) , HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) ) including the eﬀects of a change in the rel-
ative composition of ﬁxed costs.
We observe that a HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 )equilibrium is delimited from below by rl and
from above by rg and the relevant jump-line. Note that, as in the GE case, a high F
increases the area of equilibria.
As for the HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) , we have shown above that it is always an equilibrium.
Thus, all points above rg represent an equilibrium. Note that changes in the composition
of ﬁxed costs only slightly alter rg, and hence the area of equilibria.
Finally, within our parameter values we observe that the area of a HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 )
is rather small, again with its size increasing with relatively high country ﬁxed costs.
34Figure B-5
Specialist equilibrium
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05 for base scenario.
f = 100; F = 300 for ”High F”a n df = 300; F = 100 for ”High f”.
35Figure B-6
Generalist equilibrium
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05 for base scenario.
f = 100; F = 300 for ”High F”a n df = 300; F = 100 for ”High f”.
36Figure B-7
Hybrid equilibrium
Parameter values: H = 100,000; δ =0 .2; f = 200; F = 200; p =0 .05 for base scenario.
f = 100; F = 300 for ”High F”a n df = 300; F = 100 for ”High f”.
37CD i ﬀerent size regions
In this appendix we describe the outcome of our model when introducing diﬀerent size
regions. For this we introduce a slight change of notation. We denote by Mi (i ∈ L,H)31
the stock of houses in each region assuming that ML >M H. The steps to analyze the model
are the same as in the text. Hence, we ﬁrst present the equilibrium candidates, then the
conditions that must hold for (Nash) equilibrium. Finally, we present the situation of the
reinsurance company and the resulting social cost analysis.
Table C-1 summarizes the equilibrium candidates. The only notable change is the fact
that a HEL(rS =0 ;rG =0 )is now ex ante possible.
Equilibria are obtained by determining the conditions under which a single insurer does
not have an incentive to deviate. Table C-2 presents these conditions.
These conditions are very similar to the ones for equally sized regions. Thus one can again
determine the area of equilibrium for each candidate, and identify sequences of equilibrium
conﬁgurations for increases in the premium rate. Similarly, the expressions for the expected
proﬁts of the reinsurer are almost identical to the ones in Table 3. Note particularly, that
these proﬁts are again non-positive in all cases.
In order to illustrate the social cost of the system under diﬀerent size regions we speciﬁed
two sequences a) and b). We assume that ML is ten times bigger (1,000,000 houses) than
MH (100,000 houses), while the other basic parameters are identical to the scenarios before:
p =0 .05, f = F = 200, γ =0 .2.
Sequence a) corresponds to sequence ii) in the illustration before, i.e. a small diﬀerence
in damage probability across regions. We assumed pL =0 .049 and pH =0 .06. Similarly,
sequence b) represents sequence iii) from above with pL =0 .04 and pH =0 .15.
Figure 7 in the text presents the social cost for these sequences.
Table C-1























GE (rG =0 )
(ML+MH)θγ
(2f+F)
GE (rG =1 )
ML(θ−pL)+MH(θ−pH)
(2f+F)












































Summary of Nash equilibrium and minimum number of insurer conditions with diﬀerent
size regions
Equilibrium
Candidates rD Nash-equilibrium condition
SE(rL =0 ;rH =0 ) 0 MLθγ
MLθγ+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )
Case 1 0 MLθγ
ML(θ−pL)+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
SE(rL =1 ;rH =0 )















SE(rL =1 ;rH =1 ) 1 ML(θ−pL)
ML(θ−pL)+f+F (f + F) − f ≤ 0
GE (rG =0 )











GE (rG =0 )


























HEL(rS =0 ;rG =0 ) 0 always Nash
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =0 ) 0 f −
θγ
θ−pL (f + F) ≤ 0
HEL(rS =1 ;rG =1 ) 1 always Nash
HEH(rS =0 ;rG =1 ) 1
f −
(θ−pH)
θγ (f + F) ≤ 0
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